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In his book, Neuroethics, justice and autonomy: public 
reason in the cognitive enhancement debate, Veljko Du-
bljevic´ reflects upon the issue of cognitive enhancement 
technologies, i.e. stimulant drugs or cognition enhance-
ment drugs (CED) and stimulation devices, within the 
framework of political philosophy, with respect  to the 
risk of violating rights and justice raised by the actual 
lack of adequate regulation. This focus is particularly 
relevant in the present society, where, in addition to the 
ethical and political issues raised by cognitive enhance-
ment technologies, new social and economic pressures 
raise additional issues deserving a dedicated analysis. To 
illustrate, pressure to enhance is likely to rise in contexts 
like the military, the education, and several jobs, with an 
increasing influence of private business.  
The author is right in stressing that CED pose new is-
sues than genetic enhancement, because they target the 
mind of competent adults making individual choices for 
themselves, even if it might be objected that compe-
tence is a controversial concept. The rationale behind 
the analysis of the book, which is grounded on Rawls’ 
philosophy,  is very clear and agreeable in its simplic-
ity: despite the tendency to see pro-enhancement ar-
guments as liberal and progressive, applying the liberal 
principles of justice to the discussion on CED leads to 
the conclusion that, because of the lack of an adequate 
regulation, cognitive enhancement might be a violation 
of equal rights and liberties of people preferring not 
to use it.  Moreover  CED might violate the principle 
of equal opportunity.  Thus  the question why justice 
did not play a central role in the neuroethical discus-
sion about CED arises.  
The question of justice in relation to CED might 
also be framed in terms of public priorities: given the 
limited resources available, it might seem unfair to in-
vest money in CED rather than for other health related 
needs. This is a legitimate concern, even if it might be 
argued that, at least on theory, the use of CED could 
be a tool for figuring out new solutions to actual health 
needs. Yet it is true, as stated by the author, that as a 
matter of fact CED are used (if not even conceived) as 
a mean for getting personal advantage. How to react 
to this state of affairs? The author’s suggestion is to use 
economic disincentives, for both individuals and com-
panies: fees for citizens willing to use CED and special 
taxation procedures for companies interested in pro-
ducing them. Economic disincentives would be a tool 
for the state to exercise its influence, which is justified 
because unregulated use of CED challenges the princi-
ple of justice. First because private interests are fulfilled 
at the expense of the public; second because cognitive 
enhancement actually affects the very structure of our 
society limiting the individual capacity to formulate and 
revise rational choices concerning their lives. 
The second point in particular is related to the in-
direct coercion exercised on citizens to use cognitive 
enhancement.  If the topic is not new in both neuro-
ethical and political literature, the argument in support 
of its relevance provided by the author is very interest-
ing, and argued for using the rational choice theory. The 
conclusion of the argument is that if a sufficient num-
ber of people expect others to use cognitive enhance-
ment in a certain competitive context, that is enough to 
start a chain of reactions supporting the use of cognitive 
enhancement in order to not be left out. After having 
highlighted the limits of the two classical models of cog-
nitive enhancement regulation (i.e., prohibition vs per-
missive or  laissez-faire  approaches), the author  argues 
for the Economic Disincentives Model (EDM), which 
is a sort of middle way approach including forms of tax-
ation and fees, as well as periodic tests about the perils 
of cognitive enhancement for people using it. The mon-
ey gained through the application of the EDM would 
be invested for activities of public utility.  I agree that 
this model basically balances the other two approaches: 
it allows an active role of the state without denying a lib-
eral organization of society, even though it is not com-
pletely clear to me how to balance the prohibition to 
produce and sell CED with the acceptability of private 
use by individual citizens. 
A key concept of liberal society is autonomy. The 
third chapter of the book is dedicated to the conceptual 
analysis of this key notion, arguing against a confusion 
that has often affected bioethics, neuroethics, and po-
litical philosophy, among others, i.e. the confusion be-
tween/conflation of the metaphysical notion of free will 
and the political notion of autonomy. The author rightly 
stresses that the concept of autonomy embedded in 
the legal and political system of pluralistic democratic 
societies does not presuppose any religious or meta-
physical doctrine. The political  concept of autonomy 
is open to empirical scrutiny. Particularly interesting is 
the minimal or basic sense of autonomy, which emerges 
from the interaction with empirical sciences: it requires 
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only that the agent is able of making rational decisions 
in accordance with his or her own long-term interests. 
This is a form of self-determination that should not be 
conflated with free-will. Three components of autono-
my are identified: volitional (agents act voluntarily or 
intentionally), cognitive (agents have sufficient infor-
mation and understanding), and liberty  (there are no 
controlling influences on agents, both external or inter-
nal). In sum, autonomy presupposes having the power 
of self-control and self-regulation, not necessarily  ex-
ercising this power all the time.  Both coercive (from 
external) and compulsive (from internal) influences are 
possible at different levels of intensity. Since they can 
diminish the personal capacity for long-term rational 
and autonomous decisions, both coercion and compul-
sion justify the intervention of the state without denying 
individual autonomy. 
Highly illustrative is the example of addiction that the 
author provides: the model of autonomy he developed 
leads to the conclusion that both the moral and the 
medical models of addiction are false because ground-
ed on a view of autonomy as not gradual but rather as 
an all-or-nothing capacity. In fact, addicted autonomy 
is highly compromised but not totally gone. The mis-
understanding arises again from the confusion between 
the political notion of autonomy and the metaphysical 
notion of free will: to avoid this confusion precedence 
should be given to practical application over metaphysi-
cal justification. This is the core of the argument devel-
oped in the book. 
To summarize, the following main points can be iden-
tified in the book: 
• policy proposals and detailed models (e.g., what is a 
responsible use of CE) are scarce;
• particularly, regulatory environment for enhancement 
technologies (e.g.,Transcranial  Magnetic  Stimula-
tion,  transcranial Direct Current Stimulation) is no 
clear;
• in order to more effectively address the ethical issues 
raised by CE it is necessary to reflect less on abstract 
positions and more on concrete proposals to regulate, 
providing their operationalization in society;
• the EDM argued for in the book is a sort of middle 
way between laissez-faire and prohibition;
• the philosophical engagement with neuroscience 
and neurotechnologies should be framed as a politi-
cal neuroethics, i.e. a combination of both practical 
and theoretical reflections on the basis of political 
categories (e.g., autonomy), mainly inspired to John 
Rawls. 
This book is an excellent example of political neuro-
ethics, which is a form of conceptual reflection inter-
ested in how political categories can help in analyzing 
the impact of new technologies on society. 
Within the contemporary reflection on the statute 
of neuroethics, three main methodological approaches 
have been identified [1] eventually calling for a concep-
tual expansion of the field [2]. A “neurobioethical” ap-
proach is primarily normative and prescriptive: it applies 
ethical theory and reasoning to practical issues arising 
from neuroscientific research and its applications. An 
“empirical neuroethical” approach is descriptive and oc-
casionally explanatory: it uses empirical data to inform 
theoretical (e.g., what is moral reasoning) and practical 
issues (e.g., who is really a moral agent). A “conceptual 
neuroethical” approach is primarily theoretical and par-
ticularly interested in clarifying fundamental notions. 
Basically it calls for a conceptual clarification of rele-
vant notions in order to adequately deal with the issues 
raised by neuroscience. But semantic clarification does 
not exhaust the conceptual neuroethics work. In fact, at 
a deeper level, it emphasizes the need to develop and 
use a methodological modus operandi for effectively in-
tegrating scientific (e.g., neuroscience) and philosophi-
cal (e.g., ethics) interpretations.
Ideally these three approaches, even if distinct, are 
combined in practice. The political neuroethics argued 
for by Dubljevic´ is highly illustrative in this respect. In 
fact, it combines practical, descriptive, and conceptual 
interests, eventually showing how mature philosophi-
cal reflection can help in clarifying the issues raised by 
contemporary science and technologies, their impact 
on traditional political categories, and how to deal with 
them. This approach seems promising also with respect 
to recent calls for thinking new strategies in order to 
make neuroethics  more effective  in dealing  with the 
issues raised by contemporary science and technolo-
gies  [3], particularly by  big international  brain initia-
tives [4]. Last but not least, political neuroethics seems 
very promising also with respect to one of the pillars of 
Responsible Research and Innovation  (RRI), which is 
the engagement of citizens for reflecting on science and 
technologies and anticipating their future impact [5]. 
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[Flies, grasshoppers, beetles, 
and a Nobel Prize. He was just 
a boy. The meeting with Rita 
Levi Montalcini changed his 
life]
Even if especially intended for young fellows, mainly 
adolescent and young-adults possibly facing the idea of 
starting a scientific biomedical career, this lively bio-
graphy is strongly suggested to anyone interested in 
how started, developed, florished, and still prosecutes 
a very peculiar, yet thrilling biographical sketch. Luigi 
Aloe, born 1943, for decades the strictest collaborator 
of the 1986 Nobel laureate for Medicine or Physiology 
Rita Levi-Montalcini, eventually got in 1989 from the 
prestigious “Alma Mater” University of Bologna, fol-
lowed by a subsequent laurea honoris causa in Medicine 
at a Bulgarian university. The stubborn, intelligent and 
very concrete figure of Luigi was born in a very humble 
family in the small seaside village of Amantea, Calabria, 
Southern Italy. Starting from being busboy of a spoiled 
tailor, (where he learned some skills very relevant to his 
“golden hands” subsequent technological career) he 
emigrated, as many poor Italians from socio-econom-
ical deprived Southern areas, in Germany. Thanks to 
the fortunate effort of Prof. Armando Rigobello (a phi-
losopher active at Rome Tor Vergata University) he got 
a secondary school degree while undergoing the hard 
work of construction worker. But his second important 
step was when he was enrolled by the neuroscientist 
Prof. Giuseppe Colombo, Faculty of Medicine, Uni-
versity of Perugia, who introduced in his laboratory the 
young Luigi as an animal keeper, responsible for a col-
ony of beetles, a task which also included the constant 
cleaning of their “perfumed” faeces. 
When Rita Levi Montalcini came to Colombo’s lab 
for giving one of her magnificent conferences, Colombo 
boasted of having a genial beetles’ keeper who, despite 
his scientific illiterateness, invented and executed a va-
riety of very clever experiments. Impressed from such a 
strange story, Rita immediately proposed to Luigi to fol-
low her in her US lab, at one of the most prestigious neu-
roscience American temples, the Washington University 
in St. Louis, Missouri. There, Luigi’s skills, motivation 
and innumerable scientific results made the rest. Neu-
roscience discoveries accumulated. A new, important 
scientists was born and his exceptional curriculum of 
publications achievement and prizes today well testifies 
of his uniqueness. By the way, rumours arise that Luigi 
Aloe’s biography soon could become a television fiction. 
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